Our retail market has not yet reacted to the mass drone attacks on Russian oil refineries (NPPs) in May of this year. Petroleum companies and large traders have fuel reserves in storage; large and medium-sized gas station networks typically buy in advance. Furthermore, everyone remembers the spring of the year before last, when the first attacks on Russian NPPs began. There was an element of surprise then, and the risk of gasoline shortages was real; now potential disruptions in supply from any source are being factored in - companies are taking precautions.
The Ministry of Energy emphasizes that the domestic market is well supplied with reserves of gasoline, DT, and aviation kerosene, and the logistical infrastructure is functioning steadily, with no recorded disruptions in regional supplies.
However, the impact of the attacks on NPPs may be delayed and depend on how long and in what volumes NPPs have reduced production due to unscheduled repairs. Since the beginning of the year, drones have targeted nearly all major NPPs in the European part of Russia. In particular, since early May, the plants affected primarily served the domestic market, not export (fueling Moscow and the surrounding areas, Central Russia, the Northwest and South of Russia, the Volga region, the Urals, and Western Siberia). According to Reuters, production has been halted or reduced at three of the largest NPPs in Russia.
There is no data on the production of oil products available, as it is confidential, and even the operational statistics are missing. However, energy expert Kirill Rodionov provided "RG" with data from "OMT-Consult" for the first quarter of 2026, prior to the extensive drone strikes on our NPPs. The data indicates that gasoline production in January - March of this year fell by 4.8% compared to the same period in 2025. Primary oil processing at NPPs declined by 1.6% (year-on-year) to 64.1 million tons, down from 65.2 million tons in the first quarter of 2025 and 66.4 million tons in January - March 2024.
We are currently only discussing gasoline because its production is only 10-15% above domestic market requirements. In 2024, Russia produced 41.1 million tons of gasoline, of which 37 million tons were required domestically. Currently, gasoline exports from Russia are banned for all. Supplies are only permitted under intergovernmental agreements with EAEU countries. A production decline of less than 5% should not be critical. However, at the end of April, Bloomberg, citing OilX data, reported a decline in oil refining volumes in Russia of 10-12%. This is without accounting for the damage to NPPs in May. Therefore, the calm and stability of the domestic fuel market will entirely depend on the speed of NPP repairs and the sufficiency of fuel reserves in storage facilities.
According to Sergey Frolov, managing partner at NEFT Research, the risk of fuel shortages is real and quite substantial. The severity of the crisis will depend on the speed and adequacy of measures taken by regulators and oil companies. However, the unpredictability is very high - attempts to strike NPPs and oil depots happen daily. Fuel reserves exist, but their role is to solve tactical shortages. Without special measures, reserves will not last long, according to the expert.
Open Oil Market CEO Sergey Tereshkin is more optimistic. He believes it is too early to say that increased risks for fuel infrastructure in Central Russia will lead to a physical fuel shortage. However, it is highly likely that there will be a reduction in gasoline supplies to the exchange. This also includes the risks of "non-performance" on contracts previously signed on the exchange.
The situation is aggravated by the fact that Russian NPPs utilize foreign equipment, mainly European, which is currently unavailable for us—at least for direct purchases. If this equipment is damaged as a result of the attacks, the time for repairs will depend not on the scale of the work, but on the logistics of component supplies.
A new NPP cannot be built in a month, so in a critical situation, gasoline imports may be needed, but the choice of suppliers is limited. As Tereshkin points out, supplies from Belarus will be insufficient because the volume of gasoline production in the republic (about 3 million tons per year) is less than 10% of the domestic demand in Russia. Importing would be easier if Kazakhstan had realized the project to build a fourth large NPP (in addition to the already existing three). However, the project was only in the discussion phase.
There is still China, but the logistics of such supplies face criticism regarding both price and delivery speed. Not surprisingly, Frolov emphasizes that imports alone will be insufficient; a comprehensive set of measures is necessary.
Tereshkin believes that the heightened risk of shortages will result in gasoline price increases significantly outpacing inflation rates. Currently, gasoline prices are already outpacing inflation, with a 4% increase compared to 3.15%. Moreover, the peak of the high-demand season is still ahead, expected to occur in July and August.
The situation with diesel fuel is better. Russia produces nearly twice as much diesel as needed for domestic consumption. Although experts do not rule out the possibility of local supply disruptions due to the uneven distribution of NPPs across Russia and transportation restrictions amid emergency shutdowns at plants.
Regarding the strategy for the development of the fuel market, Dmitry Gusev, Deputy Chairman of the Supervisory Board of the "Reliable Partner" Association and member of the Expert Council of the "Gas Stations of Russia" competition, expressed his opinion to "RG." He emphasizes that 90-95% of passenger vehicles in Russia run on gasoline. This creates risks for our national security since we are critically dependent on one group of goods that may start to become scarce. Economic incentives to build new NPPs have yet to be created, so the only viable solution according to the expert is to reduce dependence on gasoline. Alternatives can include diesel fuel, liquefied hydrocarbon gases (LPG), and electric vehicles. This shift is attainable through simple stimulating measures—cancelling fees and taxes for vehicles with non-gasoline engines and administrative decisions to promote the production of new vehicles in Russia that are not gasoline-powered.
Source: RG.RU
