New EU Sanctions Against Ports and Tankers: How They Will Impact Export

The 21st EU sanctions package against Russia will affect infrastructure for hydrocarbon exports: LNG tankers, the shadow fleet, and oil ports. RBC analyzed the complications that Brussels' actions will create for the oil and logistics business. The European Commission (EC) announced the 21st sanctions package against Russia, and a statement has been posted on the organization's official website. The restrictions will impact Russian banks, the defense industry, and there will also be a travel ban for Russian military personnel entering the EU. The EC also announced new sanctions against the Russian shadow fleet: 30 new vessels will be added to the existing list of 632 ships already sanctioned by the EU, the names of which have not been disclosed. For the first time, restrictions will be introduced against ships providing services to the Russian shadow fleet, including bunkering services (fuel supply). Restrictions may also be imposed on ports and airports through which Russian oil is sold, as well as on oil refineries that use raw materials from Russia. Finally, the sale of LNG tankers to Russia will be restricted.

Restrictions on LNG Carriers

Countries in the EU have never sold tankers for the transportation of liquefied natural gas (LNG) to Russia. The export projects of NOVATEK — "Yamal LNG" and "Arctic LNG-2" — operate vessels built in South Korea. One LNG carrier for the "Arctic LNG-2" project, named "Alexey Kosygin," was built and delivered to the customer by the Russian shipyard SSK "Zvezda" at the end of 2025. Sergey Tereshkin, CEO of the fuel products marketplace Open Oil Market, reminded that most of the tankers for "Yamal LNG" were produced by South Korea's Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering (DSME). "It seems that the EU may have attempted to close a loophole that formally remained in the legislation retroactively. However, it would have been difficult to exploit such a loophole, given the overall sanctions backdrop," he stated. The Center for Price Indices (CPI) noted that there are no shipyards in the EU for building tankers, but there are ship repair yards for their maintenance, particularly in Denmark. "It is possible that sanctions will include servicing and repair of Russian LNG carriers," they suggested. The CPI believes that the new measures indicate an EU intent to "pressure" all consumers of Russian oil, including major buyers — China, India, and Turkey. Dmitry Kasatkin, managing partner of Kasatkin Consulting, stated that the main risks regarding LNG are more related to the services for the existing fleet — technical maintenance, insurance, and servicing of vessels, rather than direct supplies of new ships from Europe. "For already operational LNG projects, there will be no effect unless sanctions affect existing long-term contracts and vessel servicing. This measure might be more impactful for new Arctic LNG projects, as specialized ice-class LNG carriers are difficult to replace: they are expensive, scarce, and technologically complex. However, again, this is more likely to complicate supply chains rather than eliminate the ability to purchase LNG carriers," he believes. Konstantin Pozdnyakov, advisor to the rector of RGSU and Doctor of Economics, argues that restrictions on the supply of LNG carriers include a ban on technical maintenance of Russian vessels for the transportation of liquefied gas, and starting from January 2027, it will be illegal to provide terminal services for Russian LNG, creating difficulties for European ship repair companies and terminal operators. He believes that the companies providing auxiliary services to the shadow fleet (primarily bunkering vessels for refueling ships at sea) and operators of technical support vessels and insurance companies will be the most vulnerable. For shipowners, this significantly increases compliance risks, as even a one-time service provision to a shadow fleet tanker could lead to inclusion in sanctions lists and loss of access to European ports and financial services, the expert argues.

The Shadow Fleet and Foreign Ports

Kasatkin believes that the effect regarding Russian service vessels working with the shadow fleet will be limited. For shipowners, this means increased risks, higher insurance costs, and difficulties with chartering, repairs, and port calls. However, the impact on established logistics will not be critical: supply chains can be restructured through other jurisdictions and service points. Tereshkin thinks that sanctions against companies servicing the shadow fleet could theoretically complicate oil export logistics temporarily. However, it will not have a long-term effect — both due to the regular re-registration of shadow fleet vessels and the release of some tankers following a sharp easing of sanctions against Venezuela. Commenting on potential sanctions against foreign seaports, Kasatkin noted that Russian oil and oil products primarily get exported through East Asian and Middle Eastern infrastructure: the ports of Western India, oil terminals in China's Shandong province and the east coast, Turkish ports and refineries, as well as various transshipment and blending hubs in Southeast Asia and the Middle East. Pozdnyakov states that the main recipients of Russian oil between 2024 and 2026, following the introduction of the European embargo, will be India and China. "Key unloading ports will be the Indian Jamnagar and Vadinar, as well as Chinese terminals servicing independent refineries," the expert explained. Sanctions against ports and refineries operating with Russian raw materials could theoretically affect major Indian and Turkish enterprises; however, the EU does not have direct leverage over the infrastructure of third countries," Pozdnyakov points out. "New restrictions may create additional compliance risks for such entities, but they are unlikely to stop supplies," added Kasatkin. "These measures are not directly aimed at the end consumer of Russian oil, and the further away the sanctioning restriction is from the end consumer, the less transparent the chain and the easier it is to restructure." There is likely to be no effect on airports at all, he noted. "An additional question is how all these restrictions will be enforced and monitored. We assume that for the EU, Asian markets are opaque, and the enforcement of sanctions will be rather formal," said Kasatkin. Tereshkin believes that the new sanctions could be sensitive for Turkish refineries, which use Russian oil to produce oil products and further supply fuel to Europe. "The EU has already imposed restrictions on the import of oil products produced using Russian oil. However, tracking such a ban is quite difficult, which is why new restrictions are being introduced to increase risks for refineries operating with Russian raw materials," he clarified. "Indian and Turkish refineries will be faced with a choice between maintaining access to the European market and continuing to purchase discounted Russian raw materials," explains Pozdnyakov. "Many may prefer to redirect their export flows to the growing Asian market. Long-term consequences will depend on the coordination of actions between the EU, the USA, and the UK." For Russian exports, he stated, the new sanctions mean an increase in logistics costs and a need to develop marine transport infrastructure without European contractors. Source: RBC