Foreign State Debts to Russia Reach a Record Since 1998: Bangladesh is the Largest Debtor

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Foreign State Debt to Russia in 2024: Analysis of Debtors and Amounts
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Foreign State Debts to Russia Reach a Record Since 1998: Bangladesh is the Largest Debtor

Foreign Debt of States to Russia Rises to $33.1 Billion — a 26-Year High. An Analysis of Major Debtor Countries, the Role of the CIS, and Investment Risks for Global Investors.

In 2024, the debt of foreign states to Russia increased by $2.6 billion, reaching $33.1 billion — the highest level since 1998. This estimate is provided by the World Bank, indicating that Russian lending to foreign partners is actively expanding despite sanctions pressure. Moscow has become a significant creditor for several developing countries, increasing the issuance of government loans and export credits.

According to the World Bank, by the end of 2024, 38 countries had debts to Russia. For the first time in decades, the largest debtor was not a CIS country: Bangladesh surpassed Belarus and took first place with a debt of $7.8 billion. Meanwhile, Belarus's debt decreased to $7.6 billion, placing it in second position. The top five largest borrowers also include India ($4.9 billion), Egypt ($4.1 billion), and Vietnam ($1.4 billion).

A New Peak of Debt and Historical Context

The volume of external debts owed to Russia has reached a historic high for the post-Soviet period. The previous peak was in 1998 when the debt of foreign states was around $38 billion. However, by the end of the 1990s, a significant portion of this amount was inherited from the Soviet era and was subsequently restructured or written off. In the 2000s, Moscow undertook large-scale debt write-offs for developing countries — estimates suggest that more than $100 billion was forgiven to countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America as part of initiatives to ease the debt burden and strengthen diplomatic ties.

Due to the write-offs of old debts, the overall debt owed to Russia significantly decreased by the 2010s. The current increase to $33 billion is primarily due to new loans issued by Russia over the past decade. Unlike the Soviet era, current loans are targeted; they are directed towards financing specific projects and supporting allies. Thus, the current record level of debt reflects Russia’s enhanced role as a creditor in the new geopolitical landscape.

Top 5 Debtors to Russia

The majority of the debt is concentrated in a few countries. As of the end of 2024, the five largest borrowers account for nearly 80% of the total debt owed to Russia. The leaders are as follows:

  • Bangladesh — $7.8 billion (an increase of $1.2 billion over the year)
  • Belarus — $7.6 billion (a decrease of $125 million over the year)
  • India — $4.9 billion (an increase of $799 million over the year)
  • Egypt — $4.1 billion (an increase of $815 million over the year)
  • Vietnam — $1.4 billion (no change over the year)

In comparison, the smallest debt to Russia is held by the small island nation of Grenada — only about $2,000, indicating either complete repayment or the symbolic nature of its obligations. The contrast between the largest and smallest debtors highlights the concentration of the Russian credit portfolio: the two leading countries (Bangladesh and Belarus) together account for nearly half of all debt owed to Russia.

CIS Countries: The Importance of Neighbors and Allies

Until recently, CIS countries led the list of Russian debtors. Belarus had long been the largest borrower, regularly attracting Russian loans for budget support and joint projects. Its current second position ($7.6 billion in debt) reflects the ongoing close financial ties between Minsk and Moscow, although the slight decline in debt in 2024 indicates that Minsk has started to pay down some of its obligations.

Other states in the post-Soviet space have significantly smaller debts to Russia. For example, Uzbekistan increased its debt in 2024 by only $39 million, likely due to utilizing new credit lines for infrastructure projects. The Caucasus countries have virtually ceased their debts: Georgia, for instance, completely repaid its remaining historical debt to Russia in 2025. Overall, the share of CIS countries in the total external debt to Russia has decreased, giving way to countries in Asia and Africa; however, for key allies — such as Belarus — Russian loans remain critically important.

Export Projects and Strategic Interests

The increase in foreign countries' debts to Russia is driven by a targeted lending policy that serves both economic and geopolitical objectives. A significant portion of Russian loans is tied to specific projects: for instance, the construction of nuclear power plants. Bangladesh received financing from Russia for the construction of the "Rooppur" nuclear power plant — this explains the rapid growth of its debt by almost 19% over the year. Similarly, Egypt is increasing borrowings for the "El-Dabaa" nuclear power plant project and other infrastructure, which led to a 24% increase in its debt in 2024. Such projects provide Russian companies (notably "Rosatom") with large export contracts and a long-term presence in partner markets.

Another driver is loans for the purchase of Russian products, primarily arms. India — a traditional buyer of Russian weapons — increased its debt by nearly $800 million over the past year, likely in relation to payments for the delivery of air defense systems and other equipment with deferred payments. Similarly, Vietnam and Egypt have received state export credits for military equipment in previous years. By providing credit to foreign clients, Moscow supports the export of its high-tech goods and strengthens defense and technical cooperation.

Financial Risks and Investment Aspects

For Russia, providing loans to other states is a form of investment, albeit one fraught with risks. Loans are typically issued on favorable terms: for example, loans for nuclear power plants have long grace periods and relatively low-interest rates. This assists partners in servicing their debts but means moderate returns for the creditor itself. Nevertheless, such loans are tied to future fuel supplies, maintenance of equipment, and other ancillary services, which create long-term profit sources for Russian companies.

However, repayment risks remain. Some borrowers of Russia are experiencing significant debt burdens and economic difficulties. For instance, Egypt is facing a currency shortage, and Belarus's economy heavily relies on Moscow's support. In the event of defaults or the need for restructuring, the Russian budget would have to absorb the costs, as seen previously with the debts of several countries. Meanwhile, the total volume of such assets ($33 billion) is currently not critical for the Russian economy (less than 2% of GDP), but it is noticeably increasing. Investors must consider that the growth of external credit is part of Russia's strategy to enhance its influence, which comes at the cost of frozen capital and potential losses in the event of adverse developments.

Outlook: Further Growth of the Credit Portfolio

Given budgetary plans, Russia does not intend to reduce the volume of external lending. For 2026–2028, the federal budget allocates about 1.8 trillion rubles (approximately $18.5 billion) for providing government and export loans to foreign countries — a 14% increase from previously planned amounts. These resources will primarily be directed to "friendly" countries for financing infrastructure projects, equipment supplies, and other needs.

If all planned loans are realized, the total debt owed to Russia could reach historical highs in the coming years, surpassing the levels of the late 1990s. This would strengthen Moscow's presence in the economies of its partners but would also increase potential payment default risks. Global investors must monitor this dynamic: the expansion of the Russian credit portfolio reflects a redistribution of financial influence in the world — away from traditional Western donors towards new creditors, such as Russia and China. For borrowing countries, Russian funds represent an alternative source of development, while for Moscow, they serve as a tool of "soft power" and a means to expand economic influence.

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