Geopolitical tension reached a peak amidst reports of a possible "complete and total blockade" of Venezuela, promised by Donald Trump. The U.S. president didn’t hold back, asserting that Washington intended to reclaim its rights to Venezuelan oil, which had been "illegally seized" by local authorities during nationalization.
In the wake of these statements, tangible "hawks" appeared in the skies over the Caribbean: the U.S. naval aviation was demonstratively deployed. Data from Flightradar24 recorded F/A-18E/F Super Hornet fighter jets, two Boeing EA-18G Growler electronic warfare aircraft, and an E-2D Advanced Hawkeye airborne early warning aircraft in the airspace. This array of technology, which could be presented as "ready to strike," is, in fact, a standard display of force within the framework of "diplomatic pressure."
Venezuela responded in a symmetrical and quite practical manner, playing its own card: military escort.
Western media reported that tankers transporting oil by-products (urea, petroleum coke) from Jose Port headed towards Asia under the protection of the Venezuelan Navy. The state-owned PDVSA rushed to assure that its vessels were completely safe and exercising their legal right to free navigation.
Apocalypse enthusiasts faced disappointment: Trump addressed his compatriots, criticized the previous administration, praised himself, and did not declare war on Venezuela. Instead of an invasion, there was a pause; instead of an operation, rhetoric about "restoring justice" and reclaiming "stolen" assets, referring to the history of nationalization initiated under Hugo Chávez.
It is also important to note that domestic support for a forceful scenario within the U.S. is limited. A Quinnipiac University poll showed that two-thirds of Americans (63%) oppose invading Venezuela, which lowers political risks for the White House. Brandishing weapons politically is safe, but entering the trenches is highly disadvantageous. This entire geopolitical drama would make sense if Venezuela had maintained its role as a leading supplier. However, the figures indicate otherwise; that is why the oil market did not succumb to panic.
"Serious disruptions to the oil market are not to be expected, as Venezuela's oil production has decreased more than threefold over the last two decades—from 3.1 million barrels per day (b/d) in 2004 to 910,000 b/d in 2024," said Sergey Tereshkin, CEO of Open Oil Market, to Vgudok. "For comparison: global oil and gas condensate production in 2024 is estimated at 82.8 million barrels per day (excluding light hydrocarbons)."
Venezuela has lost its status as the largest oil producer in South America: Brazil currently holds that title, while Guyana and Argentina are actively increasing their production... Therefore, sharp jumps in oil prices are unlikely: in the coming weeks, Brent prices will fluctuate near $60 per barrel, and next year, quotes could drop to $55 per barrel."
Thus, Venezuela's share accounts for only about 1% of global supplies. This minimizes the short-term impact on prices.
Independent expert Kirill Rodionov agrees, stressing that the effect on prices will be temporary and weak:
"If there is any price impact, it will last 1-2 days, and fluctuations will not exceed $1-2 per barrel. For the market as a whole, this is not a very significant issue."
However, if global prices remain stable, this does not mean that the tension comes without costs.
The geopolitical game translates into direct expenses for logistics and insurance. The presence of naval aviation and the threat of blockade compel shipowners to avoid risky routes, raise freight rates, and, most importantly, increase insurance premiums. The "oil war" strikes not at exchange prices but at the margins of Venezuelan exporters and the logistical costs for buyers.
The current crisis is not about collapse but about prospects. Experts agree that the show of force could be a prologue to the long-awaited and large-scale economic transformation of Venezuela.
"I expect these events to lead to a full return of Venezuela to the oil market. It’s worth noting that the country's current oil production is less than 1 million barrels per day, while in the mid-2000s, production was over 3 million barrels," continued Kirill Rodionov. "Caracas will gradually increase oil production; this is likely due to the monopolization of PDVSA being dismantled, and several independent companies will be created based on this company, involving American companies and investments... I believe that in the next 10 years, Venezuela could become another important source of oil production growth and return to mid-2000s production levels."
The reason for such a step lies in the catastrophic state of the industry. Experts draw a historical analogy; according to Mr. Rodionov, Venezuela's current oil industry collapse is even more severe than what the USSR experienced in the late 1980s. Back then, the Russian government in 1992 was forced to seek loans from the World Bank for oil production rehabilitation. This is roughly the state of Venezuela's oil industry today.
"This situation can actually be 'healed' quite easily, especially by reducing the tax burden, lifting sanctions, privatizing the sector, and canceling export restrictions. You simply privatize the oil sector, dismantle its monopolization, and invite the best oil service companies; they will quickly restore oil production. And the country will see the changes that have long been overdue," Mr. Rodionov noted.
For Russian oil exports in the short term, the threat is minimal—Venezuela's volumes are insignificant, and logistic problems can be compensated over weeks.
However, if the recovery plan works and within 5–10 years Venezuela returns to producing 3 million barrels per day, it will intensify competition.
The emergence of an additional million or two barrels of oil, similar to Russian grades, could complicate the position of domestic exporters in Asian markets. Russia will have to account for this new factor in its sales strategies and pricing policies.
Trump enjoys playing the role of peacemaker. The losses endured by American companies date back nearly 20 years. The Venezuelan oil industry was first officially nationalized on January 1, 1976. All foreign oil companies that did business in the country were replaced by Venezuelan entities.
A state oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela S.A. (PDVSA), was established, which still exists today. In 2007, Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez executed a second nationalization. This not only affected local enterprises but also the subsidiaries of Western oil companies—American Exxon Mobil, Chevron, and ConocoPhillips, British BP, French Total, and Norwegian Statoil. Chávez's decision incited outrage from the U.S. and other Western countries, who then imposed the first harsh sanctions against Venezuela, leading to the production crisis.
Additionally, one could speculate that Maduro’s army and navy possess a substantial arsenal of Russian-made surface-to-air and anti-ship missiles, and it is unlikely that the U.S. president would want to experiment by checking how South American "compañeros" have learned to utilize them.
So far, this is more of a geopolitical spectacle, carefully choreographed for the media series, than an actual oil war. The tanker escort and naval aviation are serious gestures, but without societal support and a willingness for direct intervention, they remain elements of negotiation. The market, meanwhile, counts barrels, not words, and awaits the moment when noise gives way to real privatization. The war that journalists love to declare may, in fact, be a prologue to a new stage in the development of the oil industry.
Source: Vgudok
